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Introduction 
 
Protection against retrials for the same criminal offence is a fundamental principle of criminal 
justice and procedure in legal systems concerned with securing due process of law.
1
 The ancient 
common law prohibition on multiple trials, known as the double jeopardy principle, is a legal 
concept that is well known throughout the common law world.
2
 The salutary principle has 
constitutional status
3
 and finds expression in numerous human rights treaties.
4
   
 
This article evaluates the prohibition on double jeopardy (including the recent statutory 
modification) and considers whether the protection is primarily a procedural right for the protection 
of the accused or a procedural rule to protect the institutional integrity of criminal justice process 
and judicial outcomes. 
 
 
Exposition of the principle 
 
Three essential protections are included in the principle of double jeopardy: protection from being 
retried for an acquittal, protection from retrial after a conviction, and protection from being 
punished multiple times for the same offence. Pleading double jeopardy does not entail the exercise 
of discretion, unlike the inherent power of the courts to stay a prosecution for abuse of process if 
oppression or prejudice to the accused can be established. 
 
In Registrar of Companies v District Judge Anderson,
5
 the Supreme Court considered the 
theoretical foundations and practical effect of double jeopardy. Murray CJ summarised the general 
principles: 
 
“It has for a long time been a principle of the common law that a person cannot be prosecuted 
and punished for an offence of which he has already been acquitted or convicted. This is 
commonly referred to as the rule against double jeopardy. It is a rule which applies to the 
prosecution of criminal offences. The rule, or what also might be called the notion, of double 
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jeopardy is not normally relied upon in express terms in the sense that if a person is 
prosecuted for an offence arising out of the same breach of the law or the same essential 
ingredients for which he has previously been tried and either convicted or acquitted, his 
defence to the second prosecution will be based on the pleas of autrefois acquit or autrefois 
convict. If either plea is successful the prosecution may proceed no further.…[I]f a 
prosecution was initiated against a person for an offence for which he had previously been 
prosecuted and was awaiting trial, he or she might well invoke the rule of double jeopardy in 
a general sense but the fundamental basis for resisting the second prosecution would be 
grounded more on an abuse of process or that the court concerned with the second prosecution 
had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter when another court was already seized with an 
existing prosecution for the same offence.”6  
 
This authoritative explanation of the autrefois pleas was further emphasised in DS v Judges of the 
Cork Circuit and the DPP
7
 where Denham J stated:  
 
“Autrefois convict refers to a situation where an accused was formerly convicted of the crime 
in issue. It enables a plea, and a decision if true, that he has already been tried and convicted 
of the same offence before a court. An accused may not be retried for an offence for which he 
has already been tried and convicted, and he may not be put in jeopardy of such a trial. 
Autrefois acquit refers to a situation where an accused was previously acquitted of the crime 
in issue. Similarly, an accused may not be retried for an offence for which he has already been 
tried and acquitted, and he may not be put in jeopardy of such an occurrence.”8 
 
In DS the Supreme Court held that two previous trials for sexual offences, which had ended without 
resolution when the jury failed to reach a verdict, did not amount to autrefois convict (previously 
convicted) nor autrefois acquit (previously acquitted).
9
  
 
 
Applicability of the pleas in bar 
 
Double jeopardy is a procedural defence that prohibits retrials following a legitimate acquittal or 
conviction. The accused may enter a peremptory plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict and 
consequently he cannot be retried for the same offence.
10
 
 
The principle also applies to summary trials.
11 
The applicability of autrefois pleas in the District 
Court is important given its extensive jurisdiction in terms of the number and gravity of offences 
and the punishments that Court is empowered to impose. Whereas trials on indictment involve a 
greater degree of trauma and adverse social stigma for the accused, this can equally be true where 
the accused has been summoned in respect of a multiplicity of summary offences which, when 
combined, have the potential to cause even greater distress to the accused.
12
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Double jeopardy plays a major role in the criminal justice process such as framing the indictment, 
recharging the accused with the same or substantially the same offence, post-acquittal retrials,
13
 
with prejudice prosecution appeals,
14
 discharging the jury, nolle prosequi, sentencing,
15
 the 
relationship between courts, the recognition of foreign criminal judgments (ne bis in idem),
16
 and 
the extent of the prohibition’s application to companies.17 Furthermore, there are numerous 
legislative provisions for the protection against double jeopardy, many of which have 
extraterritorial effect.
18
 
 
 
Collateral challenges 
 
The double jeopardy prohibition was not only designed to protect against multiple prosecutions but 
also to prevent the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offence. As a general 
proposition the pleas in bar have no application as between a criminal trial and later tribunals 
investigating the same facts. The degree of proof required before a tribunal is significantly less than 
that in the criminal courts. 
 
Disciplinary proceedings 
 
The determination of a disciplinary tribunal is not equated with a conviction or acquittal by a court 
of competent criminal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the superior courts may exercise the inherent 
power to stay or prohibit a prosecution as an abuse of process if it is deemed to be an unfair or 
oppressive procedure.
19
 Likewise, an acquittal by a court of competent criminal jurisdiction will not 
give rise to estoppel of subsequent disciplinary proceedings although the superior courts may 
exercise the discretionary power to injunct the subsequent proceedings on grounds of unfairness.
20
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In Garvey v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
21
 the Supreme Court held that an 
acquittal on the merits did not necessarily preclude an internal disciplinary inquiry being pursued to 
investigate the same allegation that was at issue in the criminal trial. In deciding whether or not to 
allow an internal disciplinary inquiry relating to the same allegation the court must consider 
whether the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case rendered it oppressive and unfair to 
allow the disciplinary inquiry to proceed. If on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, it 
would be basically unfair to conduct an internal disciplinary inquiry into the same matter that was at 
issue in the criminal trial, the internal disciplinary inquiry should not be allowed. 
 
In contrast to the scenario in Registrar of Companies v District Judge Anderson
22
 an accused who 
has been tried and acquitted may be subject to later disciplinary proceedings in respect of the same 
allegations. Pleas of autrefois acquit have seldom succeeded to prohibit disciplinary proceedings, 
although some have on the broader fairness-based grounds. Nonetheless, if the accused cannot rely 
on a plea of autrefois acquit, disciplinary proceedings may be restrained if the court is convinced 
that it would be unfair or oppressive to subject the acquitted person to a further investigation with 
the possibility of punishment in respect of the same or substantially the same matter as the previous 
criminal trial.  
 
There is no general principle that an acquittal must always prevent subsequent disciplinary 
proceedings in all circumstances. In McGrath v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána,
23
 the 
applicant was charged with embezzlement relating to three sums of money paid to him on foot of 
court orders imposing fines. A Circuit Court jury acquitted him on all three charges. He 
subsequently received notification that he was to be charged with breaches of Garda discipline that 
were the subject matter of the criminal charges. The High Court granted an order prohibiting the 
respondents from holding such an inquiry. However, the Court permitted an inquiry into breaches of 
discipline in relation to charges of improper practice (rather than to reopen the allegations of 
embezzlement). The respondents appealed to the Supreme Court where a unanimous Court held that 
to reopen an allegation of dishonesty which had been clearly determined by a jury verdict given on 
the merits, for the purpose of again exposing the applicant to the possibility of punishment 
constituted an unfair and oppressive procedure which should be restrained by the Court. Finlay C.J. 
stated: 
 
“…there cannot … be any general principle that an acquittal on a criminal charge in respect of 
an offence, irrespective of the reason for such acquittal, or the basis on which it was achieved, 
could be inevitably an estoppel preventing a disciplinary investigation arising out of the same 
set of facts….In those circumstances, it seems to me that a disciplinary hearing now 
prosecuted, arising out of the identical facts and allegation of corruption, would be a basically 
unfair procedure.”24 
 
Hederman J. said “[t]he hearing of the alleged breaches of discipline before the disciplinary inquiry 
would seek to repeat the same ground as in the criminal trial.”25 
 
McGrath was applied in McCarthy v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána,
26
 where the applicant 
was charged with embezzlement and fraudulent conversion following an investigation into his 
handling of public monies. He was acquitted by a verdict of the jury on all counts. Subsequently, 
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the Garda authorities convened an inquiry into alleged breaches of discipline which had already 
been the subject matter of the former criminal trial and dismissed the applicant from the force. The 
applicant claimed that this placed him in double jeopardy in relation to matters of which a jury had 
formerly acquitted him following a criminal trial. The High Court made an order setting aside the 
order of dismissal made by the disciplinary inquiry, which tended to set at nought the verdict of the 
jury. 
 
If the allegation relates to matters of internal discipline and is not in any way equated with the 
criminal charges of which the respondent has been acquitted, then as a general rule, there is no 
impediment to holding an inquiry provided that it would not amount to an unfair or oppressive 
procedure.
27
 
 
Inquiries into allegations of professional misconduct 
 
In circumstances where sanctions have been imposed by a professional body subsequent to a 
criminal trial this may not necessarily infringe the double jeopardy prohibition nor indeed constitute 
the imposition of multiple punishments for the same criminal offence. The basis for this proposition 
is that the purpose of the inquiry into allegations of professional misconduct is not to punish the 
individual for the commission of an offence, but rather to exercise control over the members of the 
profession so as to ensure their conduct conforms to the required professional standards of 
behaviour. The same is true where an individual has been subject to an inquiry first by a 
professional body and then prosecuted for an offence because. The accused will still be required to 
answer to society for the criminal aspects of his unlawful activity in addition to an internal 
disciplinary inquiry to which he is also subject due to the nature and his membership of the 
profession.  
 
AA v Medical Council
28
 concerned a medical doctor who had been acquitted on charges of sexual 
assault. He sought further temporary registration from the Medical Council who decided there was a 
prima facie case for holding an inquiry. The doctor brought judicial review proceedings in which he 
was unsuccessful in prohibiting the inquiry from proceeding on the grounds of double jeopardy. Ó 
Caoimh J. stated: 
 
“The essential issue … is whether in light of the nature of the complaints to be investigated by 
the Fitness to Practise Committee it can be said to amount to an unfair or oppressive 
procedure to investigate in particular the charges of sexual or indecent assault alleged to have 
been perpetrated by the applicant on the two patients concerned. I am satisfied on the facts of 
this case that no assault other than those the subject matter of the criminal charges are sought 
to be inquired into. In other words what is at issue is whether the proposed inquiry into items 
one and two referred to should be precluded, whatever about the conduct of inquiry into the 
allegations of professional misconduct…. In this regard what remains is not an issue as to 
whether the principles of double jeopardy have any application or whether the principle of 
autrefois acquit has any application to the facts of the instant case. I am satisfied that the issue 
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is whether it would be manifestly unfair to permit the proposed inquiry or any part of it to 
proceed in light of the acquittal of the applicant on the charges preferred against him and tried 
by the Circuit Criminal Court. In conclusion, I am of the opinion that there is no reason why 
the Fitness to Practise Committee should not hear the proposed evidence and consider it in 
relation to the conduct of the applicant. I am of the opinion nevertheless that it would be 
essentially unfair were the respondent to enter upon a hearing to determine that the applicant 
was guilty of an assault of which he has been acquitted by the Circuit Criminal Court. This is 
not to say that the committee should not hear all of the evidence proposed to be given in 
assessment of whether the conduct alleged against the applicant is conduct which it considers 
to have been established and to determine whether in the light of this fact he is a person who 
may have been guilty of inappropriate behaviour … in relation to each of the complainants 
who were allegedly examined by him when in hospital.”29 
 
In Shine v Fitness to Practise Committee of the Medical Council
30
 the High Court had undertaken 
the task of examining a large number of complaints of indecent assault made by 29 complainants 
against a medical consultant, who was seeking, by way of judicial review, to prevent the Medical 
Council from inquiring into them. The Court granted relief in the case of five complainants on the 
ground of double jeopardy, because the complaints of those five persons had been the subject of 
criminal charges which had gone to trial and the applicant had been acquitted.
31
 The respondent 
successfully appealed to the Supreme Court. Kearns J stated: 
 
“… this is not a case which would permit the application of the principle of ‘double jeopardy’. 
This is not a case of one criminal trial being followed by another. The proposed inquiry is 
being undertaken in a different context and for different purposes, including the protection of 
the public. While I am far from convinced that considerations of ‘fairness’ would normally 
preclude the first respondent from further inquiring into allegations which had been the 
subject matter of a criminal trial in which an applicant had been acquitted….”32 
 
Thus, where the inquiry was undertaken in a different context to the criminal proceedings which 
had been brought against the applicant, with different objectives, including protection of the public, 
the pleas in bar would not apply. 
 
Oireachtas joint committee inquiries 
 
In Curtin v Dáil Eireann,
33
 the applicant claimed that having been acquitted at a criminal trial he 
could not be investigated by the Joint Oireachtas Committee Inquiry effectively for the same 
offence.
34
 The High Court per Smyth J rejected the argument based on double jeopardy as the 
investigation of alleged ‘stated misbehaviour’ was a constitutional function of the Oireachtas 
designed to protect public confidence in the judiciary. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the 
acquittal of the applicant of the charges laid against him in the indictment means that he can never 
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be prosecuted again in respect of those matters.
35
 The Inquiry into the conduct of former Judge 
Brian Curtin were considering an entirely different matter, that is, whether the applicant had 
conducted himself in respect of those or very similar matters to the extent that constitutes ‘stated 
misbehaviour’ of sufficient gravity to warrant his removal from the bench. A claim of double 
jeopardy was not pressed.
36
 
 
Administrative penalties 
 
The issue may arise as to whether an accused may plead autrefois convict, or similar plea in bar, 
where he has been subject to an administrative penalty or civil sanction that is in respect of the same 
matter for which he is being prosecuted. Register of Companies v District Judge Anderson
37
 
involved criminal proceedings after the imposition of an administrative penalty. There was no 
previous trial consequently the issue of double jeopardy did not arise. Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court stated that where a heavier administrative penalty was imposed the court would examine the 
process leading to its imposition. An administrative penalty might be treated as a penal sanction in 
substance if it was excessive or disproportionate to the administrative objective being pursued.
38
 
 
 
Verdict finality 
 
One of the primary aims of double jeopardy is the preservation of the finality of judgements. A 
verdict of acquittal or conviction arises only at the proper conclusion of the criminal trial and there 
can be no conclusion of the trial until the verdict has been formally pronounced by the trial court.
39
 
 
The courts whose decisions are invested with finality and conclusivity are the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeal, which are both primarily appellate courts. The finality attaching to the 
judgments of other courts are, as Finlay CJ in Dalton v Minister for Finance
40
 expressed it, are 
“subject to a proper right of appeal as provided by law.”41 It therefore appears that where there is a 
right of appeal provided by law, finality cannot be said to attach to the decision of a court which is 
subject to that right of appeal unless and until the appeal has concluded or no appeal has been taken 
within the time limited for doing so. 
 
In O’Brien v District Judge Fahey, District Judge McCarthy and the DPP,42 where the accused had 
previously been subjected to an unresolved criminal trial, this was not sufficient grounds to prohibit 
any further prosecution in respect of the offences. There were no special circumstances that would 
have rendered it an injustice to require the accused to meet the charges against him for a second 
time. Hedigan J stated:  
 
“…I cannot accept that the proposed de novo hearing of the case against the applicant would 
amount to a violation of the rule against double jeopardy. The applicant himself sought to 
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have the proceedings before the second named respondent adjourned pending the resolution 
of the Commission’s investigation. This was something which was ultimately done by the 
second named respondent of his own volition, albeit at a later stage in proceedings. The 
crucial point, however, is that the District Court never reached, nor purported to reach, any 
finding as to the guilt or innocence of the applicant. Put quite simply, the proceedings have 
not been concluded and as such, a plea of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit can not avail.
43
 
 
The District Court trial did not conclude with a finding of guilt or innocence of the applicant and as 
the proceedings had not concluded a plea of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit could not avail.  
 
It is clear from the Supreme Court decisions in DS v Judges of the Cork Circuit Court
44
 and AP v 
DPP
45
 that if an accused has been previously subjected to one or more unresolved criminal trials 
will not, of itself, be sufficient grounds to prohibit any further prosecution in respect of the offences 
alleged. However, in DS, Denham J. explained the position as follows: “[t]here is no firm rule as to 
the number of potential trials. In each case all the circumstances require to be considered.” The 
Court in DS was concerned with successive disagreements by a jury after a complete trial. In AP, 
the Supreme Court held that a fourth trial was not per se prohibited where the trial had commenced 
on three separate occasions but on each occasion had not advanced beyond the first witness. The 
Court noted that there was no rule under statute law, common law or the Constitution that limited 
the number of prosecutions or retrials that might occur. There may be special circumstances. Each 
case was to be considered on its own facts to determine whether, in all the circumstances, a further 
prosecution would be constitutional. 
 
There are competing public and personal, or private interests to be considered. The public interest is 
to prosecute crime and to protect the public interest in fair process. The private interest of the 
accused in fairness in his trial, and the interests of the victim of crime whose interests must not be 
“swept aside” in this balancing exercise.46 Moreover, the position of the victim is integral to the 
matrix of facts in the analysis of the situation as to whether a retrial should be permitted. 
 
It is the duty of the court in accordance with due process to strike a fair and proportionate balance 
between competing public interests in the criminal trial process.
47
 Although the public interest in 
prosecuting offenders is of paramount importance, the integrity of the criminal trial process also 
requires protection, to be guarded against the inherent dangers of repeated trials for the same 
offence.  
 
An applicant seeking to prohibit a trial following previously unresolved criminal proceedings must 
demonstrate some form of prejudice arising as a result of the renewed efforts to prosecute. The 
issue as to whether it would be unjust to permit the prosecution to bring the case against the accused 
having had the benefit of hearing the entirety of his defence was considered in McNulty v. Director 
of Public Prosecutions.
48
 Hardiman J. considered such an argument and reached the following 
conclusions: 
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“The trial process may involve two or more hearings for a number of reasons. The jury may 
disagree, as happened in this case and happens not infrequently. Or the first jury may be 
discharged for one reason or another. In either event the prosecution may bring the case on 
again for trial before a separate jury unless the defendant can show that such a step would be 
oppressive. Where there is a second trial, neither side is bound to approach the case in the 
same way that they approached the first trial. New witnesses may be called, or witnesses 
called on the first occasion may be omitted. Almost every trial, especially if it proceeds to the 
point where the defendant is given in charge to the jury, will develop in a way which could 
not be wholly predicted before it started. Each side will have learnt a good deal more about 
the other side’s case. A witness who looked very impressive on paper may appear to some 
disadvantage in giving oral evidence, cross-examination may put an entirely different 
complexion on certain evidence, and legal argument, where there is any, may reveal 
weaknesses in the case of either side in the way they address certain topics, which had not 
previously occurred. It is perfectly legitimate for either the prosecution or the defence to adapt 
to these discoveries by looking again at how it will present its own case. Where there is a 
second trial, almost inevitably, each side will know more about the other side’s case than it 
did when the first trial started.”49 
 
Once the defendant has been returned for trial the court remains seized in the matter until the trial 
ends in either conviction or acquittal or the DPP enters a nolle prosequi. 
 
 
Same criminal offence 
 
The pleas in bar should be entered on arraignment and should be reduced to writing. However, in an 
exceptional case it may be raised at any time during the trial.
50
 The plea is tried by the judge alone. 
It is for the defendant to prove that he is entitled to the benefit of double jeopardy which he may do 
by producing a certified copy of the record of a previous criminal trial, especially judgments of a 
foreign court. If the accused unsuccessfully plead autrefois acquit or autrefois convict he may then 
plead guilty or not guilty. 
 
The central ingredient of raising the special pleas in bar is either a previous conviction or a previous 
acquittal for an offence possessing the same essential ingredients.
51 The second prosecution must 
not only be for the same conduct (act or omission) but also for the same offence. In Connelly v 
DPP,
52
 Lord Devlin opined:  
 
“For the doctrine of autrefois to apply it is necessary that the accused should have been put 
in peril of conviction for the same offence as that with which he is then charged. The word 
‘offence’ embraces both the facts which constitute the crime and the legal characteristics 
which make it an offence. For the doctrine to apply it must be the same both in fact and in 
law.”53  
 
                                                          
49
 [2009] 3 I.R. 572 at 580-581. 
50
 Connelly v DPP [1964] A.C. 1254 per Lord Devlin. 
51
 This is the most problematic and most litigated element of double jeopardy jurisprudence, as exemplified in Connelly 
v DPP [1964] A.C. 1254 at 1331 (one of the leading authorities on the common law principle of double jeopardy) 
where Lord Hodson opined: “What is meant or involved in the words ‘the same crime’? It is in the answer to this 
question that so much difficulty has arisen and so much argument has been entertained down to the present day not only 
in this country but in other countries where the common law prevails.” 
52
 [1964] A.C. 1254 at 1340. In Connelly, an acquittal on a charge of murder could not be raised in bar to a subsequent 
trial for robbery, even though the murder had been committed in the course of the robbery. 
53
 [1964] A.C. 1254 at 1340. 
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Thus, offences must be factually and legally the same.  
 
The superior courts have adopted the generally accepted ‘same elements’ broader test of sameness 
of criminal offences. In Conlon v Judge Kelly and the DPP,
54
 the applicant had been charged with a 
number of counts of fraudulent conversion together with one count of larceny. The jury failed to 
agree on the verdict and were discharged by the trial judge and a new trial was ordered. 
McGuinness J. stated: 
 
“In the instant case the accused has neither been acquitted nor convicted on the original counts 
and makes no objection to retrial - or more properly a new trial - on these counts. The 
additional counts are not based on the same facts or on similar offences arising out of the 
same facts; they are different offences alleged to have been perpetrated on different victims, 
and with different evidence. The additional offences are alleged to be committed contrary to 
the same section of the same statute and are all offences of fraudulent conversion….”55  
 
This is predicated on the factual and legal determination of sameness of criminal offences. There is 
no legal impediment against a second trial for the same offence based on different factual 
circumstances.  
 
In O’Brien v District Judge McCarthy,56 Hedigan J. stated it is clear “that the central ingredient of 
any invocation of the rule against double jeopardy is either a previous conviction or a previous 
acquittal in respect of an offence possessing the same essential ingredients.” In Registrar of 
Companies v District Judge Anderson,
57
 the Supreme Court per Murray CJ applied the “same 
breach of the law or the same essential ingredients for which he has previously been tried and either 
convicted or acquitted” test. Furthermore, in Re National Irish Bank (No. 2),58 the High Court per 
Kelly J. stated it was clear that double jeopardy “is a narrow principle of limited effect. It concerns 
itself with identical or similar charges not with identical evidence.”   
 
With regard to the issue of lesser-included offences, an acquittal on a charge also prohibits a 
subsequent prosecution for an offence of which the accused could have been convicted. A typical 
example being an acquittal on a charge of murder being raised as a plea in bar to a subsequent 
prosecution for manslaughter. However, where the consequences of the defendant’s criminal 
conduct have changed, with the result that a more serious offence may now be proceeded with, the 
common law pleas in bar would not be available to the accused. In The People (DPP) v 
Finnamore,
59
 the Court of Criminal Appeal per Macken J stated the case law does not “support a 
principle or rule that a plea in bar against a retrial on a more serious charge must succeed where a 
person has been convicted at an earlier trial, or on an earlier indictment, on a lesser charge.” In R v 
Thomas,
60
 the Court of Appeal held that where a defendant had been convicted of wounding with 
intent to murder and the victim subsequently died of the wounds inflicted, a plea of autrefois 
convict could not be raised against a subsequent indictment for murder. In these circumstances, 
there is a separate and distinct new offence that may be prosecuted. This procedure is logical to the 
extent that where the circumstances have substantially changed and the defendant’s criminal 
conduct was the cause of the more serious offence, both legally and factually, there should be no 
legal impediment against a prosecution for the more serious charge. 
                                                          
54
 High Court, unreported, McGuinness J., 14 December 1999. 
55
 ibid. pp. 10-11 of the unreported judgement . 
56
 [2009] I.E.H.C. 252 at para. 23. 
57
 [2005] 1 I.R. 21 at 25. 
58
 [1999] 3 I.R. 190 at 204. 
59
 [2009] 1 I.R. 153 at 171. 
60
 [1950] 1 KB 26. 
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The ‘same elements’ test (or what is otherwise known as the ‘same ingredients’ or ‘legal 
characteristics’) of sameness of criminal offences which appears to have been adopted by most 
common law jurisdictions is the more logical approach in determining sameness of criminal 
offences for double jeopardy purposes, otherwise the prosecution would be required to prosecute at 
one trial all offences committed during the course of one criminal transaction or indeed under the 
same evidence test. The same elements test would permit the prosecution to re-indict the accused 
for an offence arising out of the same criminal transaction where it can be established that the 
offence in the second indictment may be distinguished by an examination of its defining elements; 
in other words, in circumstances where the accused is being prosecuted on a second occasion based 
on the same facts or indeed evidence as adduced at the former trial, he is not being retried for the 
same criminal offence. Indeed, with the ever-increasing volume of regulatory offences an increasing 
range of activities may result in charges under several statutory provisions or under the common 
law. Otherwise, the prohibition on double jeopardy would be ineffective because the ‘same 
transaction’ (criminal episode) may leave an accused open to prosecution and conviction under 
several different statutory or common law provisions. Thus, retrials are prohibited for the same 
offence or the same subject-matter. 
  
The Criminal Justice (Administration) Act 1924 mandates the form of the indictment.
61
 The choice 
of indictment is limited to the charges expressed or implied in the book of evidence served on the 
accused.
62
 In The People (DPP) v ED,
63
 the accused was convicted of 32 offences of unlawful 
carnal knowledge and indecent assault. Each of the charges on the indictment referred to a specific, 
unknown date occurring, generally, in a specified quarter of a calendar year. The accused argued 
that the number of counts on the indictment was prejudicial to him and that insufficient particulars 
as to location and time had been provided in the indictment, particularly when it was clear from the 
book of evidence and the evidence given by the complainant that the offences were alleged to have 
occurred at five specific locations. The Court of Criminal Appeal cited relevant English authorities 
and held that the trial judge should have ordered an amendment of the indictment so that each count 
indicated, with as much particularity and specificity as the circumstances of the case would allow, 
the nature of the offending behaviour. 
 
 
Statutory modification of the common law principle 
 
One of the most significant recent developments in criminal justice and procedure is the statutory 
modification of the common law prohibition on double jeopardy introduced by the Criminal 
Procedure Act 2010. Part 3 of the 2010 Act entitled “exceptions to rule against double jeopardy”, 
made provision for post-acquittal retrial for relevant offences
64
 where new and compelling evidence 
becomes available
65
 or where the previous acquittal was tainted (i.e. where there is evidence that a 
                                                          
61
 Section 4(1) of the 1924 Act provides: “Every indictment shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, a 
statement of the specific offence or offences with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as 
may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge.” 
62
 The 1924 Act permits amendment of an indictment before the conclusion of the trial. 
63
 [2007] 1 I.R. 484. 
64
 Relevant offences are those that for the most part carry a mandatory or discretionary life sentence. The offences under 
the International Criminal Court Act 2006 which carry a maximum of 30 years in some circumstances are the exception. 
The Schedule to the 2010 Act provides that relevant offences include serious crimes including murder, manslaughter, 
rape, genocide, trafficking, offences against the State, organised crime, assault causing harm, aggravated burglary and 
robbery, arson and damaging property. Part 3 of the 2010 Act effectively follows Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 which reformed the law on double jeopardy in the United Kingdom. Rosemary Craig, “Double or Quits? A 
Discussion on Retrials for Serious Offences under the Criminal Justice Act 2003” (2008) 26 I.L.T. 238. 
65
 Criminal Procedure Act 2010, s. 8. 
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former acquittal occurred in circumstances of interference with the criminal justice process such as 
jury or witness tampering).
66
 The offences listed in the Schedule include:  
 
 murder (including murder to which section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 applies), 
manslaughter, treason, rape 
 genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ancillary offences under sections 7 and 8 
of the International Criminal Court Act 2006 
 
 offences under any of the following provisions of the Criminal Justice (United Nations 
Convention against Torture) Act 2000: section 2(1) (offence of torture by a public official), 
section 2(2) (offence of torture instigated by a public official); section 3(a) (attempt or 
conspiracy to commit torture); section 3(b) (obstructing prosecution of another) 
 
 offences under section 3 (aggravated sexual assault) and section 4 (rape) of the Criminal 
Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990; any offence under section 2 of the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences) Act 2006 (defilement of child under 15 years of age); an offence under 
section 1 of the Punishment of Incest Act 1908 (incest by males) 
 
 offences under any of the following provisions of the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person 
Act 1997: section 4 (causing serious harm); section 6(5) (syringe offences); section 8(2) 
(placing or abandoning syringe); section 15(1) (false imprisonment) 
 
 offences under section 3(1) of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (trafficking, 
taking etc., for the purposes of sexual exploitation); Any offence under section 2 (trafficking 
etc., of children) and section 4 (trafficking of persons other than children) of the Criminal 
Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 
 
 offences under section 6 of the Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 (directing 
an unlawful organisation). An offence under any of the following provisions of the Criminal 
Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005: section 9(1) (hostage taking), section 9(2) (attempted 
hostage taking); section 10(1) (terrorist bombing); section 10(2) (terrorist bombing causing 
major economic loss); section 10(3) (attempted bombing) 
 
 offences under section 71A of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 (directing a criminal 
organisation) 
 
 offences under sections 15(1) (possession of controlled drugs for unlawful sale or supply), 
15A (offence relating to possession of drugs with value of €13,000 or more) and 15B 
(importation of controlled drugs in excess of certain value) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
 
 offences under section 15 of the Firearms Act 1925 (possession of firearms with intent to 
endanger life); An offence under section 27 of the Firearms Act 1964 (prohibition of use of 
firearms to resist arrest or aid escape) 
 
                                                          
66
 Criminal Procedure Act 2010, s. 9. A retrial in the case of tainted acquittals may be ordered in respect of any offence 
tried on indictment where the first trial was tainted by an offence against the administration of justice such as bribery, 
intimidation or any other activity designed to pervert the course of justice including perjury. There must be reasonable 
grounds to believe that the offence affected the outcome of the trial, and the DPP must be satisfied that the acquittal was 
not merited. With regard to the new evidence exception, the DPP will generally have a Garda report on its investigation 
of the new evidence. Applications for retrial based on the tainted acquittal exception has a broader scope given that it 
applies in the case of all acquittals for serious offence following a trial on indictment. 
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 offences under section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 (causing explosion likely to 
endanger life or damage property) 
 
 offences of arson under section 2(1) or (3) or an offence under section 2(2) (whether arson 
or not) of the Criminal Damage Act 1991 (damaging of property) 
 
 offences under section 13(1) (aggravated burglary) and section 14 (1) (robbery) of the 
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 
 
 offences under section 11 of the Air Navigation and Transport Act 1973 (unlawful seizure of 
aircraft); An offence under section 3 (1) of the Air Navigation and Transport Act 1975 
(unlawful acts against the safety of navigation) 
 
 an offence under section 2(1) of the Maritime Security Act 2004 
 
 references in the Schedule to an offence include references to participation as an accomplice 
of a person who commits the offence 
 
 an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit any offence mentioned in the Schedule 
 
Part 4 of the 2010 Act made provision for “with prejudice prosecution appeals.” DPP v JC67 was 
the first attempt under the 2010 Act to achieve a retrial following a with prejudice appeal of an 
acquittal.
68
 The case inter alia pertained to the scope of appeals which can be brought to the 
Supreme Court by the prosecutor under section 23 of the 2010 Act. This provision expressly 
provides for exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy. A unanimous seven judge panel held 
that it would not be in the interests of justice to direct a retrial in this case. Clarke J stated: 
 
“If an appeal properly lies, then it forms part of the same process as the trial itself. If there is a 
successful appeal and a retrial is directed, then that retrial, in turn, is part of the same process. 
Any earlier acquittal is, therefore, set at nought by a successful appeal by the D.P.P. under 
section 23 and it cannot, in my view, therefore, be properly regarded as an acquittal any more 
than any judgment and order of any court which is altered on appeal can be regarded as a 
binding judgment at all save in the limited historical sense that it was, up and until the time 
when it was overturned on appeal, the position adopted by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
The question of double jeopardy properly arises when whatever procedure is available for the 
trial of an accused in a relevant jurisdiction runs its natural course and results in an acquittal. 
The issue which then arises is as to the circumstances, if any, in which it may be permissible 
to commence an entirely new process or reopen a process which has come to a natural end. 
But such is not the case here. The issue does, of course, depend on the proper interpretation of 
section 23. However, there can be no doubt that section 23 must be taken to apply in some 
circumstances. In those circumstances, an accused can properly be convicted after a retrial 
which has been directed resultant on a successful appeal by the D.P.P. under section 23. It is 
not correct, in my view, to characterise such a retrial as being in any way affected by any 
principles against double jeopardy. Rather, such a retrial is part of a single, continuous 
                                                          
67
 [2015] I.E.S.C. 31. Cecilia Ní Choileáin and Anna Bazarchina, “Admissibility of Unconstitutionally Obtained 
Evidence after DPP v JC” (2015) 20(4) B.R. 83. 
68
 Part 4 of the 2010 Act provides the DPP with a right of appeal to the Supreme Court on a ‘with prejudice’ basis 
against an acquittal where the acquittal arises from an erroneous ruling by the trial court on a point of law arising during 
the trial. Furthermore, it provided the Director of Public Prosecutions with a right of appeal on a ‘with prejudice’ basis 
against a decision by the Court of Appeal not to order a re-trial following the quashing of a conviction. 
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process in which an appeal court has corrected the error of a trial court, directed a retrial, and 
the result of that retrial will stand as the proper determination of the criminal process in the 
case in question.”69 
 
JC involved a with prejudice prosecution appeal on a point of law under section 23 on the basis that 
there had been an error of law during the original trial (erroneously excluded compelling evidence). 
This is not per se a double jeopardy issue, which is predicated on a lawful acquittal or conviction. 
This was not the case in JC.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The superior courts have provided extensive guidance on the double jeopardy principle. The 
primary rationale is to protect the accused from being prosecuted and punished more than once for 
the same offence. The principle safeguards the individual from the risks of a verdict of acquittal 
being distorted by the dangers of multiple trials, and also serves to protect the public interest in 
preserving the integrity of the criminal trial process. 
 
The potential volume of applications for post-acquittal retrial in the interests of justice will need to 
be reconciled with the procedural safeguards to ensure that the provisions are used sparingly and in 
the appropriate cases. In each case there should be a balance sought between competing interests. 
While protecting the public interest in prosecuting offenders, the integrity of the criminal justice 
process also requires protection against the inherent dangers of retrials. 
 
Exposing an accused to a series of repeated trials, or post-acquittal retrial, undermines fair 
procedures and finality in the criminal process. Indeed, this could expose the accused to a 
statistically greater risk of being convicted.  
 
In the final analysis, the prohibition on double jeopardy is a process to achieve a fair trial and 
consequently part of the integrity of the criminal justice process. 
                                                          
69
 ibid. at paras. 2.26-2.27. 
